In her recent paper ‘The Epistemology of Propaganda’ Rachel McKinnon discusses what she refers to as ‘TERF propaganda’. We take issue with three points in her paper. The first is her rejection of the claim that ‘TERF’ is a misogynistic slur. The second is the examples she presents as commitments of so-called ‘TERFs’, in order to establish that radical (and gender critical) feminists rely on a flawed ideology. The third is her claim that standpoint epistemology can be used to establish (...) that such feminists are wrong to worry about a threat of male violence in relation to trans women. In Section 1 we argue that ‘TERF’ is not a merely descriptive term; that to the extent that McKinnon offers considerations in support of the claim that ‘TERF’ is not a slur, these considerations fail; and that ‘TERF’ is a slur according to several prominent accounts in the contemporary literature. In Section 2, we argue that McKinnon misrepresents the position of gender critical feminists, and in doing so fails to establish the claim that the ideology behind these positions is flawed. In Section 3 we argue that McKinnon’s criticism of Stanley fails, and one implication of this is that those she characterizes as ‘positively privileged’ cannot rely on the standpoint-relative knowledge of those she characterizes as ‘negatively privileged’. We also emphasize in this section McKinnon’s failure to understand and account for multiple axes of oppression, of which the cis/trans axis is only one. (shrink)

This paper investigates interactive kinds, a class of kinds suggested by Ian Hacking for which classification generates a feedback loop between the classifiers and what is classified, and argues that human interactive kinds should be distinguished from non-human ones. First, I challenge the claim that there is nothing ontologically special about interactive kinds in virtue of their members being classified as such. To do so, I reject Cooper’s counterexample to Hacking’s thesis that kind descriptions are necessary for intentional action, arguing (...) that classification is required for intentional action. Having considered ways to characterise the metaphysics of interactive kinds and the semantics of kind terms, I argue that the fact that classification facilitates intentional action makes human interactive kinds ontologically distinctive because of the anomalous nature of the change which the kind-classification brings about. I then briefly examine further distinguishing features of human interactive kinds. (shrink)

_ Causal Powers _By JacobsJonathan D.Oxford University Press, 2017. xii + 232 pp.

This paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore, to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer (...) fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMetaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of (...) this paper is to explore whether the notion of functionally equivalent theories can be extended and utilized in the defence of metaphysical realism, drawing upon themes from structuralism in the philosophies of mathematics and science in which the specifics of theories do not matter as long as the relations in which they stand to other theories are maintained. I argue that despite its initial attractiveness, there are significant difficulties with this proposal. Discovering these obstacles thwarts the realist structuralist project, but reveals interesting features of metaphysical systems. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that Quine's principal argument for the Indeterminacy of Translation requires an untenably strong account of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, namely that that two theories may be compatible with all possible evidence for them and yet incompatible with each other. In this article, I argue that Quine's conclusion that translation is indeterminate can be based upon the weaker, uncontroversial conception of theoretical underdetermination, in conjunction with a weak reading of the ‘Gavagai’ argument which establishes the (...) underdetermination of the sense and reference of subsentential terms. If underdetermination is considered to be a widespread phenomenon in science, or in inductive reasoning more generally, then the Indeterminacy of Translation will be widespread too. Finally, I briefly consider two issues concerning the scope of this conclusion about the Indeterminacy of Translation: first, whether the argument presupposes behaviourism; and second, whether indeterminacy is restricted to the case of radical translation. I argue that the answer to both these questions is negative, and thus that the thesis of semantic indeterminacy remains relevant to those who disagree with Quine about some issues concerning the nature of mind and language. (shrink)

Can metaphysics ever really be compatible with science? In this paper, I investigate the implications of the methodological approach to metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In the past, metaphysics has been rejected entirely by empirically-minded philosophers as being too open to speculation and for relying on methods which are not conducive to truth. But naturalized metaphysics aims to be a less radical solution to these difficulties, treating metaphysical theorizing as being continuous with science and restricting metaphysical methods to empirically (...) respectable ones. I investigate a significant difficulty for naturalized metaphysics: that it lacks the methodological resources to comparatively evaluate competing ontological theories, or even to distinguish adequately between them. This objection is more acute when applied to robust realist versions of naturalized metaphysics, since the realist should be able to say which theory is true of the objective world. If this objection holds, then it seems that the commitment to naturalized metaphysics, or to robust realism about the categories and processes in metaphysics, will have to be relaxed. (shrink)

This paper investigates the plausibility of Witmer, Butchard and Trogdon’s proposal to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic ones in terms of independence from accompaniment and grounding. I argue that the proposed criterion is not adequate to determine intrinsicality, since according to it some intuitively extrinsic properties turn out to be intrinsic. I suggest and evaluate two responses: first, one could characterize a conception of independence which is specific to the individual instantiating the property; and second, one could justify two assumptions (...) about properties which entail that counterexample properties of the kinds I present do not exist, most importantly that there are no fundamental properties which are instantiated in an intrinsic fashion by some individuals and an extrinsic fashion by others. Although the latter seems prima facie plausible, I present some potential counterexamples to it from current physical theory. I conclude that the grounding- and independence-based criterion of intrinsicality can be defended from my objections, although the cost of doing so might make it more attractive to characterize intrinsicality in terms of independence, or in terms of grounding, alone. (shrink)

A significant ontological commitment is required to sustain metaphysical realism—the view that there is a single, objective way the world is—in order to defend it from common sense objections. This involves presupposing the existence of properties (or tropes, or universals) and relations between them which define the objective structure of the world. This paper explores the grounds for accepting this ontological assumption and examines a sceptical argument which questions whether, having assumed the world is objectively divided into fundamental properties, we (...) could ever know which properties these are. It then assesses the responses available to the metaphysical realist, arguing that the sceptical difficulty cannot merely be dismissed by means of another assumption in the manner of radical scepticism, as David Lewis suggests, but that the sceptic's argument might be defused by the non-question-begging success of some form of strong scientific realism which links the predicates of our scientific theories directly to the fundamental properties the world contains. It remains unclear however whether this widely accepted metaphysical theory can find principled philosophical support. (shrink)

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks (...) conceivability arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true. (shrink)

In his conceivability argument, Chalmers assumes that all properties have their causal powers contingently and causal laws are also contingent. We argue that this claim conflicts with how conceivability itself must work for the conceivability argument to be successful. If conceivability is to be an effective mechanism to determine possibility, it must work as a matter of necessity, since contingent conceivability renders conceivability fallible for an ideal reasoner and the fallible conceivability of zombies would not entail their possibility. But necessary (...) conceivability must either be governed by necessitating causal processes or by a necessitating non-causal mechanism. We argue that the latter option is untenable or mysterious; whereas, if Chalmers chooses the former and applies it only to conceivability, his solution is ad hoc, but if he accepts necessary causal powers or processes generally, the conceivability argument fails. We conclude that, as it stands, the Conceivability Argument does not establish that physicalism is false. (shrink)

The aim of this paper will be to show that certain strongly realist forms of scientific realism are either misguided or misnamed. I will argue that, in the case of a range of robustly realist formulations of scientific realism, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘realism’ are in significant philosophical and methodological conflict with each other; in particular, that there is a tension between the actual subject matter and methods of science on the one hand, and the realists' metaphysical claims about which (...) categories of entities the world contains on the other. (shrink)

This paper concerns the conjunction of naturalism---the thesis that the methods of science, and those alone, provide the basic sources of evidence of what there is in the world-with various types of realism. First, I distinguish different forms of naturalist realism on the basis of their ontological commitments in terms of five existential presuppositions about the entities and processes which exist independently of the mind. I then argue that some of these presuppositions are in prima facie conflict with the naturalists’ (...) endorsement of the methods of science, since certain current empirical theories could not be true if these metaphysical presuppositions are correct. Given that these ontological presuppositions have already been criticized by antirealists and supernaturalists on philosophical grounds, I suggest that realism may be more defensible from a naturalist perspective if the realist abandons, or remains agnostic about the truth of the problematic presuppositions and thereby minimizes commitment to mind-independent entities. (shrink)

Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) challenge us to expand our conception of introspection beyond neurotypical human cases. This article describes a possible 'ancillary mind' modelled on a system envisioned in Leckie's (2013) science fiction novel Ancillary Justice. The ancillary mind constitutes a borderline case between a communicating group of individuals and a single, spatially distributed mind. It occupies a grey zone with respect to personal identity and subject individuation, neither determinately one person or subject nor determinately many persons or subjects, (...) and thus some of its processes might be neither determinately introspection within a mind nor determinately communication between minds. If ancillary minds defy discrete countability, the same might be true for some actual minds on Earth. Kammerer and Frankish's research programme can be extended to include not only the study of possible forms of introspection, but also the study of possible mental activity intermediate between introspection and communication. (shrink)

Animal and plant species exhibit an astonishing diversity of sexual systems, including environmental and genetic determinants of sex, with the latter including genetic material in the mitochondrial genome. In several hermaphroditic plants for example, sex is determined by an interaction between mitochondrial cytoplasmic male sterility (CMS) genes and nuclear restorer genes. Specifically, CMS involves aberrant mitochondrial genes that prevent pollen development and specific nuclear genes that restore it, leading to a mixture of female (male‐sterile) and hermaphroditic individuals in the population (...) (gynodioecy). Such a mitochondrial‐nuclear sex determination system is thought to be rare outside plants. Here, we present one possible case of CMS in animals. We hypothesize that the only exception to the strict maternal mtDNA inheritance in animals, the doubly uniparental inheritance (DUI) system in bivalves, might have originated as a mitochondrial‐nuclear sex‐determination system. We document and explore similarities that exist between DUI and CMS, and we propose various ways to test our hypothesis. (shrink)

Plasminogen activator inhibitor‐1 (PAI‐1) is a physiological inhibitor of urokinase (uPA), a serine protease known to promote cell migration and invasion. Intuitively, increased levels of PAI‐1 should be beneficial in downregulating uPA activity, particularly in cancer. By contrast, in vivo, increased levels of PAI‐1 are associated with a poor prognosis in breast cancer. This phenomenon is termed the “PAI‐1 paradox”. Many factors are responsible for the upregulation of PAI‐1 in the tumor microenvironment. We hypothesize that there is a breast cancer (...) predisposition to a more aggressive stage when PAI‐1 is upregulated as a consequence of Metabolic Syndrome (MetS). MetS exerts a detrimental effect on the breast tumor microenvironment that supports cancer invasion. People with MetS have an increased risk of coronary heart disease, stroke, peripheral vascular disease and hyperinsulinemia. Recently, MetS has also been identified as a risk factor for breast cancer. We hypothesize the existence of the “PAI‐1 cycle”. Sustained by MetS, adipocytokines alter PAI‐1 expression to promote angiogenesis, tumor‐cell migration and procoagulant microparticle formation from endothelial cells, which generates thrombin and further propagates PAI‐1 synthesis. All of these factors culminate in a chemotherapy‐resistant breast tumor microenvironment. The PAI‐1 cycle may partly explain the PAI‐1 paradox. In this hypothesis paper, we will discuss further how MetS upregulates PAI‐1 and how an increased level of PAI‐1 can be linked to a poor prognosis. BioEssays 29:1029–1038, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans R. Gely et L. Van Eynde (éd.) Affectivité, imaginaire et Création Sociale, Bruxelles, Publications de l'université Saint-Louis, 2010, p. 13-42. Nous remercions Sophie Klimis de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Dans le cadre de cette communication, je souhaiterais déchiffrer le choix de la parataxe « affectivité, imaginaire, création sociale », comme une invitation à interroger les différentes manières dont il est possible d'articuler les éléments ainsi énumérés, et (...) - Philosophie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

The underlying psychological processes that enable framing effects are often described as cognitive. Yet, recent studies suggest that framing effects may also be mediated by emotional response. The role of specific emotions in mediating the framing effect process, however, has yet to be fully empirically investigated. In an experimental survey design, this study tests two positive and two negative emotions as mediators of framing effects. Our results show that while anger and enthusiasm mediate a framing effect, contentment and fear do (...) not. These findings deepen our understanding of which discrete emotions are relevant when studying mediated framing effects. (shrink)

This book investigates the reality of the past by connecting arguments across areas which are conventionally discussed in isolation from each other. Breaking the impasse within the narrower analytic debate between Dummett’s semantic anti-realists and the truth value link realists as to whether the past exists independently of our methods of verification, it is argued, through an examination of the puzzles concerning identity over time, that only the present exists. Drawing on Lewis’s analogy between times and possible worlds, and work (...) by R.G. Collingwood, Oakeshott and Barthes, a new proposal is advanced, as to how realist elements of ersatz presentism may be combined with historical coherentism to uphold the legitimacy of discourse about the past. (shrink)

The haploid male germ cell differentiation program controls essential steps of male gametogenesis and relies partly on a significant number of sex chromosome‐linked genes. These genes need to escape chromosome‐wide transcriptional repression of sex chromosomes, which occurs during meiosis and is largely maintained in post‐meiotic cells. A newly discovered histone lysine modification, crotonylation (Kcr), marks X/Y‐linked genes that are active in post‐meiotic male germ cells. Histone Kcr, by conferring resistance to transcriptional repressors, could be a dominant element in (...) maintaining these genes active in the globally repressive environment of haploid cell sex chromosomes. Furthermore, the same mark was found associated with post‐meiotically activated genes on autosomes. Histone Kcr therefore appears to be an indicator of the male haploid cell gene expression program and a notable element of genome programming in the post‐meiotic phases of spermatogenesis. (shrink)

The growing threat of terrorism has increased the importance of aviation security and the work of airport security officers (screeners). Nonetheless, airport security research has yet to focus on emotional exhaustion and job satisfaction as major determinants of screeners’ job performance. The present study bridges this research gap by applying the job demands–resources (JD−R) model and using work–family conflict (WFC) as an intervening variable to study relationships between work characteristics (workload and supervisor support), emotional exhaustion, and job satisfaction in 1,127 (...) screeners at a European airport. Results of structural equation modeling revealed that (a) supervisor support as a major job resource predicted job satisfaction among screeners; (b) workload as a major job demand predicted their emotional exhaustion; and (c) WFC proved to be a promising extension to the JD–R model that partially mediated the impact of supervisor support and workload on job satisfaction and emotional exhaustion. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

The study examines a model proposing relationships between personal values, positive (i.e., benefits) and negative (i.e., threats) appraisal of immigrants, and social contact. Based on a values-attitudes-behavior paradigm, the study extends previous work on personal values and attitudes to immigrants by examining not only negative but also positive appraisal and their connection with social contact with immigrants. Using a representative sample of 1,600 adults in the majority population in Israel, results showed that higher preference for anxiety-avoidance values (self-enhancement and conservation) (...) was related to higher levels of perceived threat and lower levels of benefit, while higher preference for anxiety-free values (self-transcendence and openness to change) was related to higher levels of perceived benefits and lower levels of threat. Greater opportunities for contact and perceived benefits and lower levels of threats were related to more social contact. The model showed good fit across the total sample, and across four diverse immigrant groups in Israel (diaspora immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, Ethiopia and Western countries, and asylum seekers). In line with a Stereotype Content Model, which suggests that group-specific stereotypes are related to social structural characteristics of the group, associations between variables differed by group. Results strengthen a theoretical conceptualization that posits an indirect relationship between personal value preferences and behavior through group appraisal. They highlight the importance of comprehensive conceptualizations including both positive and negative appraisal of immigrants, which take into account the way different groups may be appraised by the majority population. (shrink)

Festa, E., Roux, S. (2008). The Enigma of the Inclined Plane from Heron to Galileo. In: Laird, W.R., Roux, S. (eds) Mechanics and Natural Philosophy Before the Scientific Revolution. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 254. Springer, Dordrecht.

Technologies for human germ‐line modification may soon enable humanity to create new types of human beings. Decisions about use of this power entail an unprecedented combination of difficulties: the stakes are immense, the unknowns are daunting, and moral principles are called into question. Evolved morality is not a sure basis for these decisions, both because of its inherent imperfections and because genetic engineering could eventually change humans’ innate cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, consensus is needed on moral values relevant to (...) class='Hi'>germ‐line modification. These values could be based on characteristics of human beings that would remain constant regardless of revised genomes. (shrink)